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INTRODUCTION

A great deal of the rhetoric of evidence discourse concerns the supposed
cognitive inadequacies of the jury. In various contexts we are told that
although an item of evidence is probative, it must be excluded because the
jury will give it too much weight. I believe this approach has played far too
great a role in evidentiary law, and that it is an interesting project to see
whether we can construct a satisfactory body of law without relying at all on
the cognitive inadequacy argument. I think that, at least to a large extent, we
can. In some settings, where the cognitive inadequacy argument now causes
the exclusion of evidence, we might instead articulate other grounds for
exclusion. In some other settings we might instead decide that the best result
is admission of the evidence.
I will focus on three substantive areas of evidentiary law: hearsay,
character and prior misconduct-used both substantively and to impeach-and

* Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor,
MI 48109; (734) 647-1078; rdfrdman@umich.edu.
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expert evidence. In each of these areas, a large part of the reason usually
given for exclusion of evidence, when it is excluded, is fear that the jury will
overvalue the evidence. In each, I will contend that this argument should be
put aside. With respect to hearsay, the law may be vastly improved by the
Supreme Court's recent articulation of a strong sense of the confrontation
right independent of hearsay law. Such a right yields a categorical rule
excluding an important but relatively narrow segment of hearsay. Hearsay
that does not fit within this right might yet be excluded because of best
evidence considerations, but if neither the confrontation right nor best
evidence considerations call for the exclusion of hearsay, it probably should
be admitted.
With respect to evidence of character and prior misconduct, I believe
that in many settings the misconduct does indeed have very substantial
probative value. If it is to be excluded, as often it should be, the reason should
not be the cognitive inadequacy of the jury. A better reason is that the
evidence would likely cause the jury, and perhaps any fact-finder, to decide
the case on an improper basis. In particular, when such evidence is offered
against a criminal defendant, its impact is often to cause the fact-finder, in
essence, to lower the standard of persuasion it applies to the case. This is true
even with respect to evidence of misconduct offered against an accused for
impeachment purposes. Such evidence does not, I believe, have substantial
probative value and I doubt that juries give it much value for the purpose for
which it is supposedly offered.
With respect to expert evidence, the situation is somewhat more
complicated. I believe that the Daubert standard is too rigorous, addressing
at the admissibility stage questions that should be dealt with in making
sufficiency determinations.' When evidence is to be excluded, I do not think
it should be so much because the court believes that the evidence, while
probative, is likely to over-persuade the jury. Rather, I believe the reason
should be either a best evidence ground-that exclusion may induce the
production of better evidence-or that the court has determined that the
evidence is affirmatively misleading or of so little probative value as not to be
worth the costs of presenting it.
Before addressing these specific doctrinal areas, I will discuss in general
the nature of the over-valuation concern, and then other reasons for exclusion.

1. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993).
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I. THE OVER-VALUATION CONCERN

Most evidence scholars avoid reductionism and recognize that when the
exclusion of evidence is warranted it may be for one or more of a variety of
reasons. My basic thesis is that one reason often given, that the jury will
likely over-value the evidence, should play little or no role in evidentiary law.
Here is the over-valuation concern: Although a given piece of evidence
has probative value, enough to warrant admission if there were an ideal factfinder, the jury is likely to give the evidence too much weight, and the excess
weight means that the truth-determination process is better off if the evidence
is excluded than if it is admitted. Several points about this concern warrant
emphasis and counsel against it causing the exclusion of evidence.
First, so far as I am aware, this concern was never, or hardly ever,
mentioned until near the turn of the 19th century.' Of course, before that time,
the law of evidence had not gelled in anything like its modem form,3 but there
were enough writings on evidence in the 18th century that one might have
expected more emphasis on this point had it seemed salient then.
Second, given the emphasis that has been placed on this concern, it has
not been sufficiently subjected to empirical study. At least in the hearsay
context, empirical studies appear to demonstrate that the concern is not a very
weighty one.4
Third, the nature of the concern must be clearly understood. It is not
merely that the jurors will over-value the evidence, but that they will overvalue the evidence by so much that the truth-determination process is worse
if the jurors hear the evidence than if they do not. However valuation of
evidence is measured, that is over-valuation to a significant degree. It
essentially means that the over-valuation exceeds the "appropriate"
valuation-or, put another way, that the jury is according more than double
the appropriate weight to the evidence.

2. See Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 181-83 (1948); Berkeley Peerage Case, 4 Camp. 401,415; 171
Eng. Rep. 128, 134-35 (1811); MODEL CODE OF EvID. 217, 221 (1942) (introductory note)
("[N]ot thejury system, but rather the adversary theory of litigation, coupled with then currently
accepted notions as to the value of the oath, accounts for the hearsay rule as it was at the
opening of the nineteenth century").
3. The best known, and overstated, characterization is the one made by Edmund Burke
in 1794 that the rules of "the law of evidence ... [were] very general, very abstract, and
comprised in so small a compass that a parrot he had known might get them by rote in one half
hour, and repeat them in five minutes." 12 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 509 n.7 (1938). See also Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1208 n.138 (2002).

4.

See infra Part III.A.
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Fourth, given this calculus, there is a significant informational demand
on rule-makers or on the court, depending on whether exclusion is determined
on the basis of a broad rule or on the basis of an assessment of the facts in the
particular case. Thus, exclusion on this ground requires rule-makers, or the
court, to assess with some confidence both the appropriate valuation and the
valuation that the jury will accord to the evidence, or at least the ratio of the
two. Whilejudges may as a group be better than jurors as a group in assessing
the appropriate valuation of evidence, it is a great understatement to say they
are far from perfect; judges are "susceptible to the usual cognitive biases that
afflict most people."' In one recent study, while approximately forty percent
of a group of participating judges appear to have analyzed an evidentiary
problem correctly-better than among other groups studied-the rest did not,
and forty percent appear to have fallen prey to the "inverse fallacy," failing to
recognize the lack of identity between probabilities with transposed
conditionals.6 "[J]udicial decision making, like the decision making of other
experts and laypeople, is influenced by... cognitive illusions." 7
Fifth, when a jury sits, it is the fact-finder designated by law; indeed,
generally it sits because one party or the other has exercised a constitutional
right to have it do so. Only with reluctance should a court restrict the jury's
fact-finding ability. It goes particularly against the grain of the jury right to
exclude evidence of substantial probative value because of fears that the jury
will accord it too much weight. If sometimes a piece of evidence causes the
jury to reach a factual conclusion that the court would not have reached-well,
what else can we expect if we designate the jury, or any entity other than the
court itself, as fact-finder? Excluding evidence for fear ofjury over-valuation
strikes me as more pernicious than granting judgment as a matter of law on the
grounds that the evidence would not, or did not, support a given finding. In
granting a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court is essentially
saying, "The jury could reach (or could have reached) a given factual finding
only by doing its job poorly-probably by ignoring its instructions. There is
no reason to allow a judgment to stand on such a basis." Excluding evidence
because of the over-valuation concern effectively says, "Although a
reasonable fact-finder could use this evidence in a helpful way, it is so likely
that the jury will overuse it that the evidence must be excluded."
Sixth, even assuming the adjudicative system can-whether through
general rules or through individualized determination by the trial

5. Joseph Sanders, The Merits ofthe Paternalistic Justificationfor Restrictions on the
Admissibility ofExpert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 925 (2003).
6. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 808- 10
(2001).
7. Id. at 816.
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judge-identify evidence that the jury is likely to over-value by so much as to
make exclusion better than simple admission for truth determination,
exclusion would ordinarily be too stringent a remedy. The judge has the
power to comment on the evidence, and if a particular item of evidence raises
dangers of over-valuation it would seem appropriate for the judge to call the
jury's attention to that fact. Thejudge can give an instruction to the following
effect: "This item of evidence may have some probative value, and you should
give it such value as you deem appropriate. Be aware, however, that this
evidence may have less probative value than you are inclined to give it,
because ....

"

Though in some contexts instructions designed to limit the

impact of evidence are quite ineffectual, there is no reason to suppose that
would be true in this context. Some instructions tell the jurors, for reasons of
legal policy that might not appeal to them, to put out of mind probative
evidence that they have heard; others ask them to perform a mental gymnastic
by using evidence for a limited purpose but not using it with respect to a given
proposition for which it has high probative value, but the commentary in this
context is not of those sorts. Instead it tells the jury: "Here is information you
may not have had, and you should take that into account in assessing the
probative value of the evidence offered by a party." Conscientious jurors may
be expected to listen to and absorb such a message from the judge, who gives
it from a position of neutrality. Comment of this sort thus acts as a less
restrictive alternative to exclusion. It allows the evidence to come in, because
it may have significant probative value, and minimizes the chance that the
jurors will so over-value the evidence that exclusion would be the optimal
alternative.
Given all these considerations, I believe there should be a rather strong
presumption against invoking the over-valuation concern to exclude evidence.
At the least, this would mean that the concern should not be invoked unless
there is a well demonstrated reason to conclude that the jury is particularly
likely to over-value the particular type of evidence involved, even in the face
of judicial commentary. In some cases, this reluctance to invoke the overvaluation concern would mean that evidence that is now excluded should be
admitted, but I do not believe that the principal effect of this approach would
be to cause more evidence to be admitted. Rather, I believe the principal
impact would be to cause us to rely more on other considerations in
articulating the reasons for exclusion. I now turn to a catalog of such other
reasons.

HeinOnline -- 2003 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 971 2003
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II. OTHER REASONS FOR EXCLUSION

There are various valid reasons to exclude evidence. One is that
admission of evidence might inhibitsociallydesirablebehavior. For example,
to take two obvious examples, introduction of compromise offers and of
remedial measures taken after an accident might cause parties to be wary of
engaging in such behavior. A second valid reason for exclusion is that
introducing the evidence might violate some right or interest of a party or
other person. The confrontation right (which I shall discuss further below)
and the interest in confidentiality that underlies many privileges are two
obvious examples.
For now, though, I will focus on three other considerations that might
warrant exclusion and that might be confused with the over-valuation concern.
I will describe each of these and explain why I believe each one stands on
stronger ground than the over-valuation concern.
A. Insufficient Probative Value
First is lack ofsufficient probative value to warrantadmissibility. Even
conceding that, under the broad definition of relevance incorporated into
Federal Rule of Evidence 401, virtually all evidence is relevant,8 that does not
answer the bottom-line question of admissibility. Suppose the evidence has
very slight probative value. In a cost-free world, that might be enough to
warrant admissibility, but the real world is not cost-free. The presentation of
evidence consumes the time of all participants in the litigation, and might
induce the opponent to present rebutting evidence that would consume more
time. The probative value of the evidence may simply not be worth the costs
of presentation. The problem is not, as with the over-valuation concern, that
the jury is likely to give the evidence too much weight and thus make the
truth-determination process worse with the evidence admitted than with it
excluded; or at least that problem is solvable by the presentation of more
evidence. The ineradicable problem is simply a matter of waste.
Note that this concern does not require the court to assume that the jury
will misuse the evidence. On the contrary, it assumes that the evidence has
insufficient probative value to warrant the costs of admitting it; even assuming

8. See David Crump, On the Uses ofIrrelevant Evidence, 34 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1997);
Richard D. Friedman, Irrelevance,MinimalRelevance, andMeta-Relevance,34 Hous. L. REV.
55 (1997); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judicial Remedies for the Exposure of the Jury to
"Irrelevant" Evidence, 34 Hous. L. REV. 73 (1997); David P. Leonard, Minimal Probative
Value and the Failure of Good Sense, 34 Hous. L. REV. 89 (1997); Myrna S. Raeder,
Irrelevancy: It's All in the Eyes ofthe Beholder, 34 Hous. L. REV. 103 (1997).
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the jury will give it no more than the appropriate weight. The court
unquestionably has a legitimate interest in controlling the proceedings and
preventing time from being wasted by virtual irrelevancies. Implementing this
interest does not require the delicate informational judgment that the overvaluation concern does.
In at least one type of setting, though, these two concerns have an
interesting relationship. Suppose the court believes that, (1) as matters stand,
if the evidence in question is introduced the jurors will over-value it because
they are unlikely to have enough information at their disposal to value it
properly, and (2) with fuller information that could be presented, the jurors
would be in a better position to assess the evidence, but (3) the cost of
presenting the fuller information would make the presentation of the
challenged evidence not worth the trouble. In this circumstance it might make
sense for the court to exclude the evidence, saying in effect, "It's not that I
disrespect the jury's ability to value the evidence; rather, it is that it would be
too costly to put the jury into a position to value the evidence well."
Properly conceived, this type of response does not undermine the
argument against excluding evidence based on the over-valuation concern.
Think of three possible outcomes: (1) Exclude the proffered evidence; (2)
Admit the proffered evidence, without any responsive evidence; (3) Admit the
proffered evidence and the responsive evidence. Possibility (2) is not really
a viable option, because it would be unfair to the opponent. In comparing
possibilities (1) and (3), the problem is not that the jury is likely to over-value
the proffered evidence: the responsive evidence should minimize that
possibility. Rather, the concern is simply that the net value of introducing the
proffered and responsive evidence may not be worth the cost it would entail.
In some settings, the analysis may be somewhat more complex. It may
be that the extent to which the court believes the opponent should be allowed
to rebut the evidence will depend to a great extent on the perceived probability
that absent rebuttal, the jury will significantly over-value the evidence.
Suppose, for example, one party wishes to introduce a statement made by his
adversary in a superseded pleading. The opponent wants to explain the
reasons why he might have made the statement even without believing it to be
true. The court agrees that if the proponent is allowed to present the statement
then the opponent must have an opportunity to rebut, but because the rebuttal
would require some comprehensive understanding of pleading practice and
strategy, the court might decide that the matter is not worth pursuing. The
court might say,
Unless the jurors were fully educated on the context, they would greatly over-value
the statement, and so it would be unfair to the opponent to admit it. If I admit the
statement, therefore, I have to allow the opponent a full rebuttal. Given the jurors'
initial level of understanding, that rebuttal would entail a great deal of cost. If that
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cost were incurred, thejurors would be able to assess the evidence appropriately, but
if they were so educated on the matter, they probably would not attribute very much
probative value to the statement-or at least not enough to make admissibility
worthwhile.

This type of response should probably be limited to situations in which
the court has a clear informational advantage over the jury, and is well able to
assess how the jury's informational deficit can impair its ability to value the
evidence.
B. The Best Evidence Concern
The second basis for exclusion to be differentiated from the overvaluation concern is the best evidence concern. This is a specialized
application of the concern that admission of some evidence might inhibit
socially desirable behavior. Although a given piece of evidence may have
more probative value than prejudicial potential, and the difference may make
the cost of presentation worth bearing, it may also be that exclusion of the
evidence would induce the presentation of better evidence. Better evidence
may be more probative, or less likely to be prejudicial, or both, and exclusion
may induce the presentation of better evidence in this case, or in other cases
in which evidence of the same type as the challenged evidence may be offered,
or both. As Dale Nance points out, the best evidence principle is meant to
control the lawyers and not the fact-finder.9 That is a simple and decisive
factor making this principle a stronger basis for exclusion than the overvaluation concern. Exclusion on the basis of the best evidence principle
reflects no distrust of the jury as fact-finder; rather, it is based on the belief
that exclusion will give the fact-finder in this case, or in other similar ones, a
better informational base.
C. Bias
Finally comes bias. Like the over-valuation concern, and unlike the
concern about whether the evidence has sufficient probative value to warrant
admissibility or the best evidence concern, this is a concern that focuses on the
possibility of fact-finder misuse of the evidence. But the concern is not a
cognitive one. It is not that the fact-finder will attribute too much probative
value to the evidence. Rather, it is that the evidence will cause the fact-finder
to favor or disfavor one party more than it should. In effect, the evidence will
cause the fact-finder to apply to the case a different standard of persuasion

9.

See Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOwA L. REv. 227 (1988).
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from the one that is prescribed by law. Exclusion on this basis does not reflect
any disrespect for the jury as fact-finder. It merely reflects recognition that
jurors will have difficulty putting out of mind information that might bias
them for or against a party. To reach this conclusion, it is not necessary to
believe thatjurors are less able thanjudges to put the information out of mind,
and indeed some empirical evidence suggests that they are not.'0 It is only
necessary to believe that such compartmentalization is a difficult feat for
people, and that the bifurcation of trial roles when there is ajury, with ajudge
able to act as a screen for the jury as fact-finder, means that we need not
demand that the jury attempt the feat. Even if we are still tempted to believe
that judges are more likely than jurors to perform the feat, this is not because
of any cognitive inability on the jury's part. Rather, it is likely because the
jury is less likely than the judge to accord sufficient weight to the long-term
considerations that make it inappropriate, as a matter of law, to allow the
biasing factor to alter the standard of persuasion.
My thesis, then, is that the over-valuation concern is generally not an
appropriate reason to exclude evidence, but that several other considerations
often are. If we greatly reduce the significance of the over-valuation concern
in the way we talk about evidence, what would the result be? Sometimes it
would be to admit evidence that is now excluded. More often, though, I
suspect it would be to articulate a better reason for exclusion. Thus, the effect
of greatly reducing reliance on the over-valuation concern would not be
drastic in terms of results, but it would lead to greater clarity and candor in
evidentiary law. I think we should attempt to construct evidentiary doctrine
with as little reliance as possible on the over-valuation concern. In the next
part of this essay I will show how such an approach might work in three
significant areas of the law.
III. APPLICATIONS
A. Hearsay
We are often told that it is because of the jury that we have a rule against
hearsay. The elimination of the civil jury is the reason given for the

10. See Stephen Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A PreliminaryInquiry into the Effect
ofPotentiallyBiasingInformation on Judgesand Jurorsin Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 113, 125 (1994) (discussing an experiment yielding data that "suggest that judges andjurors
in civil cases react similarly when exposed to material that is subsequently ruled inadmissible,"
in this case evidence of a subsequent remedial measure, and noting: "[w]ere this finding to be
confirmed by asubstantial body of social science research, it would draw into question the law's
insistence on treating judges and jurors in radically different ways").
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elimination of the civil hearsay rule in Britain. The reason is supposedly that
without the benefits of cross-examination, demeanor evidence, and the oath,
the jury is not in a good position to evaluate the dangers created by hearsay the chances of misperception, failed memory, insincerity, and failure of
communication. Thus, the jury will over-value the evidence - except in those
exceptional circumstances in which the hearsay is so reliable that it may be
safely admitted, cross-examination and the other guarantees being of only
marginal value.
The theory is pernicious rubbish. It excludes some hearsay that should
be admitted, fails to provide a sound justification for excluding hearsay that
should be excluded, and gravely over-complicates the entire area. It has no
empirical foundation. The empirical evidence does not reveal over-valuation
of hearsay and even suggests the possibility of under-valuation." Bear in
mind that much hearsay has very substantial value; if the jurors are giving it
great weight, they are acting rationally.
The beginning of wisdom in the hearsay realm is recognition that with
respect to a certain type of evidence, a criminal defendant (I put aside the case
of civil litigants) ought to have a categorical right of exclusion, not because
the evidence is too unreliable or because the jury is likely to over-value it, but
because introduction of the evidence would violate his right to confront the
witnesses against him. Confrontation is an essential aspect of AngloAmerican trials. It emerged in contradistinction to systems in which witnesses
testified apart from trial and out of the presence of the parties. The essence
of the right, I believe, is this: if one makes a testimonial statement (basically,
one made in circumstances in which a person would reasonably anticipate that
it would be used as testimony) she is acting as a witness, and if the statement
is not made under the conditions under which we require testimony to be
given-principally, cross-examination under oath-an adverse party has a right
to exclude it. I believe the Constitution requires this right to be applied
absolutely in favor of a criminal defendant. The only qualification should be
that if the inability of the defendant to cross-examine the witness is
attributable to the witness's own wrongdoing, the right is forfeited. 2

11. Roger Park has made this point in this conference. See Roger C. Park, Visions of
Applying the Scientific Method to the HearsayRule, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1149, 1152-55.
12. 1 have expressed this view in numerous places, among them Friedman &
McCormick, supra note 3; Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic
Principles,86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998); and an anicus curiae brief on behalf of eight other law
professors and myself in Crawford v. Washington. BriefofAmicus Curiae Sherman J. Clark
et al., Crawford v. Washington,
U.S. , 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004) (No. 02-9410).
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Once this right is recognized-and, since this article has been nin proof,
essentially this right has been recognized, in Crawfordv. Washington "-what
are the grounds for excluding hearsay that is not covered by the right? To
emphasize that I am now putting the confrontation right out of the picture, I
will concentrate on a civil case. The empirical research suggests that we
should operate on the basis that, at least as a presumptive matter, if live
testimony of the declarant to a given proposition would be more probative
than prejudicial, so too would be a hearsay report of the declarant's assertion
ofthat proposition. This means that if the live testimony would be admissible,
then presumptively the hearsay should be, too. There might nevertheless be
good reasons to exclude the hearsay, but these reasons do not depend on an
assumption that the jury will over-value the hearsay.
For example, assume the proponent is significantly better able than the
opponent to produce the declarant as a live witness. Live testimony, perhaps
supplemented by the hearsay, is better evidence than the hearsay by itself.
Accordingly, it might make sense in some cases to threaten exclusion of the
hearsay to induce the proponent either to produce the declarant or to improve
the opponent's ability to do so (as by providing crucial information
concerning the declarant's whereabouts).
Making the declarant his own witness is less favorable to the opponent
than having an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant after direct
examination by the proponent. Accordingly, in some settings it might make
sense to provide that if the opponent timely produces the declarant ready,
willing, and able to testify, the proponent must either present the live
testimony of the declarant or forgo use of the hearsay.
Furthermore, in some settings the truth-determination process will be
significantly aided if the proponent gives notice of his intention to introduce
hearsay. Doing so may give the opponent an opportunity not only to rebut the
hearsay but also to produce the declarant. In some cases, therefore, it might
make sense to exclude the hearsay if the proponent did not give adequate
notice of his intention to offer it.
Translating these principles into a workable body of law is a complex
enterprise and I will not attempt it here.' 4 My point is that if we set aside the
over-valuation concern, we will still exclude some hearsay, but on different
grounds from the ones we recite now. The confrontation right will
categorically exclude testimonial statements offered by the prosecution unless

U.S.-, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
13.
14. 1did make a preliminary attempt in two separate articles. See Richard D. Friedman,
Toward a PartialEconomic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. 723
(1992); Richard D. Friedman, Improving the Procedurefor Resolving Hearsay Issues, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 883 (1991).
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at some point the accused has an adequate opportunity to confront the witness,
or he waives or forfeits such an opportunity. Assuming the confrontation right
is not at stake, then most hearsay should be admitted, but exclusion might still
be appropriate because of procedural concerns. Such concerns are raised, and
in some cases might be sufficient to warrant exclusion, when the proponent is
significantly better able than the opponent to produce the declarant, when the
opponent has produced the declarant but the proponent declines to present live
testimony, and when the proponent has failed to give adequate notice of
intention to introduce the hearsay. These principles can lead to a sound and
sensible body of doctrine, one that fosters truth determination and is consistent
with traditional rights, but that does not rely on the over-valuation concern.
B. Character and Prior Bad Acts
1. Used Substantively
Subject to exceptions, evidence of a person's character may not be
admitted to show that the person acted in conformity with the character on a
particular occasion.15 Nor may acts of a person that are not otherwise material
to the action be introduced to prove that the person acted in a similar manner
on the occasion in question.' 6 These rules have been based in significant part
on the over-valuation concern. Thus, the Supreme Court has said, "The
inquiry [into character] is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the
contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade
them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair
opportunity to defend against a particular charge."' 7
What basis is there for concluding that the evidence will over-persuade
the jury? The fact is that evidence of prior misconduct is highly probative of
misconduct on the occasion in question. 8 A man who has raped in the past
may be unlikely to rape on any given occasion, but he is far more likely to do
so than is a person who has never raped before. It is for this reason that
recidivism rates are significant. True, people's conduct on a given occasion
is strongly affected by the particular context, but it cannot be seriously
questioned that people have consistency of character that makes one person
more likely than another to respond in a given way to a particular set of

15.

See FED. R. EVID. 404(a).

16.

See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).

17. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
18. Cf FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note ("Character evidence is of slight
probative value" (quoting 6 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
STUDIES 657-58 (1964))).
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stimuli. 9 If this were not true, it would usually not be worthwhile for
employers to solicit references for potential employees.
I conclude, then, that evidence of character and prior misconduct is often
highly probative, and a jury giving such evidence substantial weight is acting
perfectly rationally. Absent a convincing empirical demonstration to the
contrary-and so far as I know, none has been made-there is no basis for
concluding that jurors are likely to over-value such evidence systematically,
much less that they are likely to do so to such a degree as to make the
evidence more harmful than beneficial to the search for truth. Furthermore,
though evidence of character and prior misconduct takes time to present and
rebut, its probative value is often sufficiently great that a reasonable juror
could often find it to be decisive of the case. Consumption of time therefore
does not weigh heavily in favor of excluding the evidence.
These considerations do not mean that evidence of character and prior
misconduct ought to be admitted, however. The bias concern is very powerful
in this context. A juror learning that an accused is a bad person might be
inclined to lower the effective standard of persuasion that she applies in the
case. She might in effect decide that it is not so bad if the accused is
convicted even though there is substantial doubt as to his guilt on the occasion
in question because he deserves punishment anyway, ought to be disabled in
the future, and perhaps was not sufficiently punished in the past. 20 But as a
matter of deeply rooted policy, that is not how our adjudicative system is
supposed to operate: The accused is supposed to be convicted only if he acted
criminally on the occasion charged, not because he acted criminally on other
occasions or is generally a bad person. Perhaps judges are significantly more
likely than jurors to adhere to the principle, but even they may find it too
tempting in a particular case not to do so.
In my view, this bias concern is sufficient to justify the per se rule
excluding the accused's character and prior bad acts when offered to show
that he acted in a given way on the occasion in question. But it is by no means
self-evident that this is so. A plausible argument can be made that the

19. See Richard Friedman, CharacterImpeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?]
Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637 (1991) (reviewing extensively the
literature on this subject) [hereinafter Friedman, Impeachment].
20. See, e.g., I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 645 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.
1999).
[E]vidence of convictions for prior, unrelated crimes might lead ajuror to think that
since the defendant already has a criminal record, an erroneous conviction would not
be quite as serious as would otherwise be the case. Ajuror influenced in this fashion
may be satisfied with a somewhat less compelling demonstration of guilt than should
be required.
Id. (citations omitted).
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probative value of evidence of character and prior bad acts is so great in some
circumstances that it justifies admissibility of the evidence notwithstanding
the possibility of bias. In any event, I believe we can have a more candid
discussion of the issue if we recognize that while bias is a problem in this
realm, there is no reason to suspect that over-valuation is also a problem.
One consequence of such a candid discussion would bear on the "end
runs" that are allowed around the exclusionary rule-that is, the use of prior
bad acts to prove not a propensity to act in a given way on the occasion in
question, but some other proposition, such as the accused's motive or
capacity." The courts have sometimes manipulated these alternative bases of
admissibility, countenancing flimsy arguments offered by the prosecution that
the evidence is necessary for it to prove not the accused's propensity, but
some other aspect of the case.22 It may be that courts would be less likely to
accept such arguments if their view of the situation were not cluttered by the
perception that the argument against admissibility rested to a significant extent
on the over-valuation concern. Because that concern is in fact so weak, any
focus on it may diminish a court's attachment to the exclusionary rule.
Concentrating instead on the real danger of bias would assist sound analysis.
Additionally, perhaps candor would lead to further consideration of
whether the exclusionary rule should be applied with full force in the civil
context. Given that propensity evidence may have substantial probative value
and that there is no good reason to suppose thatjurors systematically attribute
greatly excessive value to it, the question arises whether the danger of bias in
civil cases, together with the costs of presenting and rebutting evidence, are
sufficient to justify a per se exclusionary rule. I do not have any particular
sense as to what the best answer to that question is, but it is a question worth
asking.
2. For Impeachment
Similar, though not identical, considerations apply when evidence of
character or prior bad acts is introduced for impeachment rather than for
substantive purposes. I believe such evidence is more probative with respect
to the credibility of a witness than is often recognized. Willingness to flout
other social norms, by violating criminal law, for example, may be indicative

21. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (offering examples of such alternative bases for
admissibility).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of repeated homosexual molestation,
including anal intercourse, to prove intent to commit sexual assault, principally anal intercourse,
on the occasion in question).
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of willingness to flout the norm requiring truthful testimony in judicial
proceedings.2 ' Therefore, a juror according substantial probative value to
such impeachment evidence would not generally be acting irrationally, and the
over-valuation concern does not justify excluding the evidence.
When the witness is a criminal defendant, other considerations dojustify
exclusion-indeed, a much broader rule of exclusion than we have now. The
witness's incentive to lie in his own defense is obvious from the nature of the
situation. Moreover, the key question in assessing the witness's credibility
with respect to a given assertion is this: How probable is it that, if the
assertion were not true, the witness would nevertheless testify to it? When an
accused testifies to his innocence, the assumption that his testimony is false
implies that he in fact committed the crime. This means that the key
credibility assessment involves the hypothetical assumption that the accused
committed at least one crime, the very one being tried. Proof of other
misconduct will not have significant probative value supporting the
proposition that he was willing to lie in his own defense. I have summarized
this argument by contending that the use of character impeachment evidence
against a criminal defendant requires the assumption that jurors would draw
an inference like the following:
At first I thought it was very unlikely that, if Defoe committed robbery, he would be
willing to lie about it. But now that I know he committed forgery a year before, that
24
possibility seems substantially more likely.

However, this kind of inference is utterly lacking in logic and common
sense. It is unlikely that jurors use it to assess the credibility of the accused
testifying in his defense. Inevitably though, they are tempted to use the
evidence for a purpose for which they are not supposed to consider it-in this
case, determining that the accused is a bad person. This means that the
impeachment evidence has a serious biasing effect-and because of that, the
threat of such evidence often intimidates a defendant from exercising his
fundamental right to testify in his own defense for reasons unrelated to the
over-valuation concern. Thus, character impeachment evidence of criminal
defendants ought to be forbidden.
With respect to other witnesses, however, the situation is considerably
different. Even if a prior crime did not in itself involve dishonesty, was not
particularly serious, and occurred rather remotely in the past, it may still have
substantial probative value with respect to the witness's inclination to tell the
truth under oath. Not only the nature of the prior crime, but also other factors,

23.
24.
article.

See Friedman, Impeachment, supra note 19, at 651-54.
See id. at 637. This paragraph of text summarizes the main argument of the earlier
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such as the relationship of the witness to the case, should determine
admissibility." In some cases, the impeachment value of the evidence will
outweigh the costs of presenting and rebutting it as well as any danger that it
creates bias against the party favored by the witness, and in others not.26 The
key for present purposes is that in any event the over-valuation concern does
not enter into the picture.
C. Expert Evidence
Much of the rhetoric addressing expert evidence revolves around the
possibility that jurors will over-value the evidence. In some cases this seems
to be an undeniable possibility. The very point of expert evidence is to inform
the jury27 on matters that the jury is unlikely to be able to assess without
assistance. This leaves the jury vulnerable to persuasion by evidence that,
properly understood, would not have much value. Such evidence is likely to
be presented to them because the generation and selection of expert evidence
is, in the first instance, in the hands of the parties.
Nevertheless, I believe the over-valuation concern as such should not
generally cause trial judges to exclude expert evidence. Often the problem
with expert evidence should be dealt with as a matter of sufficiency rather
than of admissibility. Assuming that sufficiency is not a problem, there are
reasons other than the over-valuation concern to exclude much expert
evidence. If a given item of expert evidence clears each of these hurdles and
seems likely to be over-valued, the best result is to admit it subject to judicial
comment. I have made the argument at some length elsewhere28 and will
merely sketch it out here.
First, in many cases in which the courts have treated the admissibility of
expert evidence as a problem, the real issue has not been whether the given
item of expert evidence should be admitted, but whether the evidence taken
as a whole was sufficient to support a verdict for the proponent. I believe this
was true in each of the trilogy of cases recently decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court on the standards governing admissibility of expert evidence: Daubert

25. Thus, I contend that the flexible standard of FED. R. EVID. 608 for impeachment by
bad acts should apply as well to impeachment by prior convictions with respect to witnesses
other than a criminal defendant, a topic now covered by FED. R. EVID. 609.
26. See Friedman, Impeachment, supra note 19, at 680-87 (explaining these
considerations in depth).
27. 1should say more broadly to inform the trier of fact. For ease of reference, though,
I will speak of the jury.
28. See Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1047 (2003).
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v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,29 GeneralElectricCo. v. Joiner,3° and
3 1 In each
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.
of these cases, the evidence in
question was offered by the plaintiff, and in each it was dubious whether, even
including that challenged evidence, there was enough proof to support a
finding in favor of the plaintiff. But in each, if the plaintiff had introduced
enough evidence to support a finding in his favor, I think the challenged
evidence definitely ought to have been admitted as part of the body of
information to be considered by the jury. Treating the question in these cases
as one of admissibility, instead of sufficiency, distorts the admissibility issue,
forcing the admissibility standard to be overly rigorous because it is doing the
work that should be done by a sufficiency determination. Moreover, as I have
pointed out in Part I, judging the evidence insufficient as a matter of law does
not reflect disrespect for the jury in the way that a ruling of inadmissibility for
fear of over-valuation does. The ruling of admissibility provides that, because
there is too great a chance that the jurors will over-value the evidence, they
will not even be allowed to learn of it, even though the evidence might in fact
have significant probative value. The ruling of law, by contrast, is based on
the perception that given all the evidence, the jurors could reasonably come
out only one way on a given issue. Therefore, if thejurors come out the other
way, they must not be doing their job right. Perhaps they over-valued the
evidence, but not necessarily. It may be that jurors decided the case on the
basis of grounds, such as mere sympathy for the plaintiff, that the law does not
countenance.
Now let us assume that the evidence as a whole is sufficient to reach the
jury (or perhaps the proponent of the evidence in question does not bear the
burden of producing evidence). Thus, whether the evidence in question is
admitted or not, the jury will decide the facts. In some cases, the challenged
expert evidence should be excluded as a matter of law, not because it is likely
to be over-valued by the jury though it has significant probative value, but
because it has no substantial probative value at all, or too little to warrant the
time it would take to present and rebut, or because it is affirmatively
misleading. Often the problem is that, though the evidence describes a
phenomenon that may have some scientific bearing on the case, the expert's
description draws misleading inferences. With respect to such matters as
microscopic hair comparison and DNA evidence, for example, experts
frequently overstate the significance of a match between a sample taken from
the accused and one found at the crime scene. The problem in such cases is
not that the jury will likely over-value the expert's testimony, rather the
29.
30.
31.

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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problem is that the testimony is wrong, and wrong in a way that may be
damaging to the search for truth. Detecting such inaccuracies is not always
easy, but when courts put in the effort they are often better than the experts
themselves at analyzing the situation logically. When they detect a significant
logical error in presentation, the evidence should be excluded as a matter of
law. One advantage of treating the matter as one of law is that this fully
engages the appellate process, which tends more than trial-level procedure to
ensure deliberate consideration of logical problems.
There are other reasons why the admissibility of some expert evidence
should be excluded as a matter of law. If the proponent insists that his
testimony is based on a scientific proposition, then by definition that
proposition is applicable beyond the bounds of the particular case and will
probably be one that will recur from case to case. Ideally, the identical
proposition of scientific fact should not be deemed to be true in one case and
not true in another. Even if the proposition is in dispute, a ruling that runs
across cases may be appropriate. Such a ruling must be made by the courts,
and ultimately by the court of last resort in the jurisdiction. The result of
such a ruling may be exclusion of a class of expert evidence, but the ruling is
not based on the fear of jury over-valuation of the evidence. Indeed, the
predicate for such a ruling is not that the courts are better able than jurors to
evaluate scientific evidence, but that the courts are better able to make rules
for a run of cases.
Furthermore, such recurrent matters tend to involve repeat players-most
notably, in criminal cases, prosecutors, defense counsel, laboratory
technicians and testifying forensic experts-in the creation of forensic
evidence. This factor makes it especially appropriate to apply best evidence
rules going beyond the individual case-that is, rules excluding even evidence
that would assist truth determination in this case-because exclusion would
likely induce the creation of better evidence not only in this case but in others.
For example, the proffered evidence might be excluded on the grounds that the
procedures used in creating it were sub-optimal; such a ruling would
encourage repeat players to adopt optimal procedures. Or perhaps with
sufficient effort-and the incentive provided by a threat of exclusion-the
proponent could make a showing of such matters as proficiency by the testing
laboratory, so that the jury could better assess the probative value of the
evidence.
Such rules of exclusion are based on significant policy
determinations, which should be made as matters of law. They do not depend
on a determination that the jury is likely to over-value the proffered evidence
by so much that the jury is better able to find the truth in the particular case
without that evidence than with it.
Now suppose that the challenged expert testimony has cleared all these
hurdles. The evidence taken as a whole is sufficient to go to the jury; the
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challenged testimony has significant probative value; the court cannot say that
the testimony misstates the inference to be drawn from a scientific
phenomenon or that it depends on an inaccurate scientific proposition; there
is no reason to exclude this testimony in hopes of inducing the presentation of
better evidence. It is beginning to sound as if the challenged testimony is
good evidence that might play a useful role in the determination of the facts.
Nevertheless, suppose the trial court is afraid that, although the testimony has
significant probative value, the jury is likely to so over-value it that admission
of the evidence will hurt rather than help the quest for truth. Even in this
situation, I do not believe the over-valuation concern should lead to exclusion
of the evidence.
First, we may well doubt the court's ability to make the assessments
necessary to exclude the evidence on this basis. To conclude that the jury will
over-value the evidence by so much as to hurt truth determination requires
both the judge's best assessment of the probative value of the evidence and
her assessment of how much probative value the jury actually will give to the
evidence. The first of these assessments requires the judge to do essentially
what the jury must do when it is presented with the evidence,32 but judges, as
well as juries, have difficulty with scientific evidence. Anyone who believes
that trial judges understand perfectly well all the expert testimony presented
in their courtrooms has not spent very much time in trial courtrooms or
reading trial court decisions.33 The second assessment requires the judge to
understand the psychology of the jury. In some cases, the judge may have an
adequate basis in the psychological literature to make such an assessment, but
that is not true as a general matter.
Suppose that despite these considerations the judge is confident after
analyzing the matter carefully that, if left to its own devices, the jury will be
inclined to over-value the expert testimony to a substantial degree, perhaps by
so much that exclusion is preferable to admission of the testimony. Even in

32. 1say "essentially" because the court's determination of the probative value of the
evidence may be guided or constrained by law, thus, federal courts, in attempting to determine
whether expert evidence is "reliable," must satisfy the standards ofDaubert and may be inclined
to use the criteria that it suggested.
33. For a review of some of the empirical evidence bearing on the question ofjudges'
ability to assess scientific evidence, see Sanders, supra note 5. As indicated in Part I, Sanders
concludes that judges are susceptible to the usual cognitive biases. One study discussed by
Sanders indicates that most state courtjudges have a great deal of difficulty explaining - not to
mention applying- the falsifiability and error rate criteria of Daubert. See Sophia I. Gatowski
et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey ofJudges on Judging Expert Evidence in a
Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2001). Sanders presents some preliminary
evidence indicating that federal judges are becoming more sophisticated in applying the Daubert
criteria.
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this circumstance, exclusion would not ordinarily be the optimal solution. A
less restrictive alternative is to comment adversely on the evidence. And, as
I have argued above in Part I, there is no reason to suppose that such comment
would be ineffective.
In sum, a sound approach to expert evidence can be developed without
relying on the prospect of jury over-evaluation as a basis for excluding
evidence. Sometimes the court should rule as a matter of law that the
evidence does not support a judgment in favor of the proponent, but that is a
much different matter. Sometimes the evidence should be excluded because
it has too little probative value to justify the time it takes to present and rebut,
or because it is affirmatively misleading; often, that is the type of decision
courts should make as a matter of law. And sometimes also courts should
exclude expert evidence, even though it would advance the search for truth in
the particular case, to induce the proponent to produce better evidence. If
expert evidence bearing on a material matter passes all these obstacles, it
probably should be admitted. If the trial judge nevertheless is concerned that
thejury will likely over-value the evidence, she probably should explain to the
jurors why, although the evidence may have significant probative value, it may
not have as much value as they are inclined to believe. That is a better
resolution than simple exclusion.
CONCLUSION

I have painted with a broad brush because this is a brief article, but my
intellectual aspiration in this piece is not small. I believe we should alter
significantly the way we view evidentiary decisions. Fear that the jury will
over-value evidence should play little role in determining whether evidence
should be admitted. Ending our reliance on the over-valuation concern will
presumably result in the admissibility of some evidence that is now excluded.
Probably more significantly, however, doing so would foster candor in
evidentiary discourse. Thus, it would help focus our attention on alternatives
to exclusion, such as rulings of insufficiency and comment on the evidence.
Finally, it would cast in a clearer light the various factors that sometimes do
make exclusion of evidence appropriate.
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